Abstract. In this paper we analyse SAFER K-64 and show a weakness in the key schedule. It has the e ect that for almost every key K, there exists at least one di erent key K , such that for many plaintexts the outputs after 6 rounds of encryption are equal. The output transformation causes the ciphertexts to di er in one of the 8 bytes. Also, the same types of keys encrypt even more pairs of plaintexts di erent in one byte to ciphertexts di erent only in the same byte. This enables us to do a related-key chosen plaintext attack on SAFER K-64, which nds 8 bits of the key requiring from 2 44 to about 2 47 chosen plaintexts. While our observations may have no greater impact on the security of SAFER K-64 when used for encryption in practice, it greatly reduces the security of the algorithm when used in hashing modes, which is illustrated. We give collisions for the well-known secure hash modes using a block cipher. Also we give a suggestion of how to improve the key schedule, such that our attacks are no longer possible.
Introduction
In 6] a new encryption algorithm, SAFER K-64, hereafter denoted SAFER, was proposed. Both the block and the key size is 64. The algorithm is an iterated cipher, such that encryption is done by iteratively applying the same function to the plaintext in a number of rounds. Finally an output transformation is applied to produce the ciphertext. For SAFER the suggested number of rounds is 6. Strong evidence has been given that SAFER is secure against di erential cryptanalysis 7] and against linear cryptanalysis 2]. In 11] it was shown that by replacing the S-boxes in SAFER by random permutations, about 6% of the resulting ciphers can be broken faster than by exhaustive search.
In this paper we analyse SAFER and show a weakness in the key schedule. It has the e ect that for virtually every key K, there exists at least one di erent key K , such that for a non-negligible fraction of all plaintexts the outputs after 6 rounds of encryption are equal. The output transformation causes the ciphertexts to di er in one of the 8 bytes. These pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts can be found in time from about 2 22 to 2 28 encryptions. All estimates of complexity in this paper are the number of 6 round SAFER encryptions. Two keys encrypting a plaintext into the same ciphertext is called a \key-collision" in the literature and in 10] a brute-force key-collision attack on the DES was given, which can be applied to any block cipher. Given a plaintext P the method nds two keys for which the two encryptions of P are equal and requires about 2 32 operations for a 64 bit block cipher.
What we have found for SAFER is much stronger. For (almost every) given key K there exists (at least) one other key K , di erent from K only in one byte, such that the encryption functions induced by the two keys encrypt from 2 22 to 1:7 2 28 plaintexts the same way in the 6 rounds of encryptions. The output transformation makes the ciphertexts di er in one byte, the same byte in which the keys di er. For some keys, K, there are up to 9 other keys encrypting a non-negligible fraction of all plaintexts in the same way as K. Also, for the same types of keys, K and K , the encryption functions induced by the two keys encrypt from 2 29 to 2 35 pairs of plaintexts, P and P , di erent only in one byte, the same way in the 6 rounds of encryptions. The output transformation makes the ciphertexts di er in the same byte. Interestingly, the keys, the plaintexts and the ciphertexts di er in the same byte.
We use our observations to establish related-key chosen plaintext attacks, which using from 2 44 to 2 47 chosen plaintexts nds 8 bits of the secret key with probabilities from 1 to 2 ?59 depending on certain circumstances of the attacks. Related-key attacks are not the most realistic attacks, and our results may have no greater impact on the security of SAFER in practice when used for encryption. However, rst of all, it can be avoided by re-constructing the key schedule, secondly it greatly reduces the security of the algorithm when used in hashing modes.
In hashing modes using a block cipher algorithm as building block the plaintext (and/or the key) is exclusive-or'ed to the ciphertext to produce a kind of one-wayness in the hash algorithm. We found collisions of such hash functions in estimated time about 2 23 encryptions when SAFER is used as the underlying block cipher. This should be compared with a brute force collision attack, which requires about 2 32 operations. The keys we used were well-chosen, but with our method collisions can be found faster than a brute force attack for most keys. This paper is organised as follows. First we give a short description of SAFER. In Sect. 3 we describe the weakness in the key schedule and give examples of the above mentioned (pseudo)-collisions. Next we use our observations to establish a related-key chosen plaintext attack on SAFER. In Sect. 4 we describe attacks on hash modes using SAFER and give examples of collisions. In Sect. 5 we give di erent methods of how to improve SAFER to avoid the problems described in the preceding sections.
Description of SAFER
SAFER is an r round iterated cipher with both block and key size of 64 bits and with all operations done on bytes. The key is expanded to 2r + 1 round keys each of 64 bits, described later. The designer's recommendation for r is 6 6] . Each round takes 8 bytes of text input and two round keys each of 8 bytes.
The input and the round keys are divided into 8 bytes and the rst round key is xor'ed, respectively added modulo 256, according to Fig. 1 . The bytes are then processed using 2 permutations or S-boxes, X(a) = (45 a mod 257) mod 256, and the inverse of X, L(a) = log 45 (a) mod 257 for a 6 = 0 and where L(0) = 128. After the S-boxes each byte of the second round key is added modulo 256, respectively xor'ed, and nally the so-called Pseudo-Hadamard Transformation (PHT) is applied to produce the output of the round. PHT is de ned by three layers of the 2-PHT, which is de ned by 2-PHT(x; y) = (2 x + y; x + y) where each coordinate is taken modulo 256. Between two layers of 2-PHT's a permutation of the bytes is done, see Fig. 1 . After the last round an output transformation is applied, which consists of xoring, respectively adding modulo 256, the last-round key. ? ?
? ?
P P P P P P P P P q P P P P P P P P P q The key of 64 bits is expanded to 2r + 1 round keys each of 64 bits in the following way. Let K = (k 1;1 ; :::; k 1;8 ) be an 8 byte key. The round key byte j in round i is denoted K i;j . The round key bytes are derived as follows: K 1;j = k 1;j for j = 1; :::; 8 and k i;j = k i?1;j << 3 (1) K i;j = k i;j + bias i; j] mod 256 (2) for i = 2; :::; 2r + 1 and j = 1; :::; 8. '<< 3' is a bitwise rotation 3 positions to the left and bias i; j] = X(X(9i + j)), where X is the exponentiation function described above.
Some Properties of SAFER
The following lemma is used in this paper. 3 Weakness in the Key Schedule From the previous section it is seen that key byte j a ects only S-box j directly in every round. Let K = (k 1 ; :::; k 8 ) be an 8 byte key. Consider the rst byte in the rst round. A key byte is rst xor'ed to the plaintext byte, the result is exponentiated and another key byte is added modulo 256, the ciphertext byte after one round is X(y K 1;1 ) + K 2;1 ; where K 1;1 ; K 2;1 are derived from k 1 . While it is true that this is a permutation of the plaintext byte to the ciphertext byte for a xed key, it is not a permutation of the key byte to the ciphertext byte for a xed plaintext. Let K = (k 1 ; :::; k 8 ) be an 8 byte key di erent from K in only one byte, say byte no. 1. Then if k 1 and k 1 encrypt some of the 256 possible inputs to S-box 1 in every round the same way, obviously K and K encrypt some 64 bit plaintexts over 6 rounds the same way.
If, say, n inputs to an S-box in the s'th round are encrypted the same way by two such keys we will say that the keys encrypt equally with probability p s = n 256 . Also we will call two such keys related. Consider S-box 1, K and K again. If a byte y is evaluated the same way with the two keys in S-box 1, i.e. X(y K 1;1 ) + K 2;1 = X(y K 1;1 ) + K 2;1 then so is the byteỹ = y K 1;1 K 1;1 128. This follows from Lemma 1 and 2. Since L is the inverse of X, a similar property holds for the logarithmic S-boxes. Therefore n is always a multiple of 2. The probability that a 64 bit plaintext encrypts into the same ciphertext using such two keys is 6 Y s=1 p s 2 6 =2 48 = 2 ?42 ;
and the number of plaintexts is Pl = 2 64 Q 6 s=1 p s 2 22 . Here we have tacitly assumed that the p i 's are independent. This is not the case, however our experimental results have shown that the product (3) of the round probabilities is a good approximation for SAFER with 6 rounds. Since this phenomenon is isolated to one S-box we could easily do an exhaustive search for all such pairs of keys. them are related to K, choose keys K di erent from K only in byte 2 and so on. Again we can do an exhaustive search for all S-boxes isolated. The total number of keys for which there are no such other keys di erent in only one byte is about 2 40 . For many keys K there exists more than one related key, on average about 2 related keys, and in some cases there are as many as 9 keys related to K. In the search for the plaintext/ciphertext pairs that coincide for two keys it is not necessary to do two full 6 rounds of encryptions. One can start the encryptions in the second round with the inputs to this round such that the ciphertexts after the rst two rounds of encryption are the same. This can be done easily by precomputing two small tables. Assume that the two keys di er in the rst byte only. For the 256 possible values of the text output of the rst S-box in the rst round, store in a table the values for which the two keys decrypt to equal plaintexts. For the 256 possible values of the text input to the rst S-box in the second round, store in a table the values for which the two keys encrypt to equal values. By pairing the values in the two tables and determining which PHT inputs whose rst byte equals the rst byte of a pair give a PHT output whose rst byte equals the second byte of this pair, one can compute all the 64 bit inputs to the second round, such that the two keys encrypt equally in both the rst and the second round.
Then after every round of encryption one checks whether the encryptions are equal. In most trials only 1 round of encryption is needed for every plaintext in a pair. Therefore one needs only to do about 1 6 2= Q 6 i=3 p i encryptions, which is 2 22 in the optimal cases. Again we note that the output transformation, which consists of xoring, respectively adding modulo 256, the key K 2r+1 makes the above ciphertexts di er in one byte, exactly the byte for which the keys di er. As illustrations we list in Fig. 1 To nd such \collisions", one can use the same method as described above for the result of Theorem 3, but this time start the search in the third rounds, such that the encryption in the second and third rounds are equal. Once two ciphertexts di erent in only byte b k are found, the ciphertexts after one round are decrypted into two plaintexts di erent in only byte b k . Examples of collisions from Theorem 4 are given in the section about collisions of hash functions. We can use Theorem 4 to establish a related-key attack on SAFER.
A Related-key Chosen Plaintext Attack
In 3, 4, 1] new attacks based on related keys were introduced. In this section we apply the principles of these attacks and introduce a chosen plaintext attack on SAFER. Assume we have access to two oracles, one encrypting plaintexts with a key K, the other encrypting plaintexts with a key K , such that K and K are related, i.e. encrypt a non-negligible fraction of all plaintexts the same way. Assume without loss of generality that the keys di er only in byte b 1 { Sort the ciphertexts just received and check, if any ciphertext in fC i g di ers from any ciphertext in fC j g only in byte b 1 . If a match is found the two ciphertexts are output. If ciphertexts are output in the last step of the above attack, we search exhaustively for two 8 bit keys k and k for which the encryptions of the bytes b 1 for the two corresponding plaintexts yields equal outputs after one round. For these key bytes we check if the xor of the byte b 1 for the two ciphertexts is the value of the xor of the last-round key bytes induced by k and k . If this is the case we have found 8 bits of the secret key with a high probability. It could happen by accident that two ciphertext blocks are di erent only in one byte without the property that the encryptions after each of the 6 rounds are equal. But clearly that would happen only with negligible probability.
The attack is repeated until the last step of the algorithm outputs two ciphertexts. Note that since we choose all 256 plaintexts di erent in one byte, we can consider 2 16 pairs of plaintexts, consisting of one plaintext encrypted under one key and another plaintext encrypted under the second key. It follows that there are 256 pairs of plaintexts encrypted the same way in the rst round. According to Theorem 4 the above algorithm succeeds with probability at least 2 29 2 ?64 = 2 ?35 and therefore needs to be repeated at most about 2 35 times, in the optimal cases only 2 29 times. The number of chosen plaintexts needed in the worst cases is about 2 2 8 2 35 = 2 44 . The probability of success is about 0.63. The attack can be extended to the case where the attacker has no knowledge of the byte for which the keys di er. The above attack is simply repeated for all 8 bytes requiring a total of 2 47 chosen plaintexts. If the two keys are chosen at random di erent in only one byte, the attack succeeds with a probability of 3:5 256 , according to Theorem 4. Two randomly chosen 8 byte keys will be di erent in only one byte with probability 8 255 256 2 ?56 ' 2 ?53 . Therefore, if all of the 8 bytes of the two keys are chosen at random, the attack succeeds with a probability of 2 ?53 3:5 256 ' 2 ?59 . We summarize our results in Table 2 for SAFER with the recommended 6 rounds. We note that the complexities given are worst case considerations. The factor 0.63 in the probabilities can be increased by using more chosen plaintexts. In Table 3 we give the complexities for similar related-key attacks on SAFER reduced to (the rst) 4 and 5 rounds.
Our attacks may seem unrealistic. But imagine Alice and Bob are sending many messages to each other every day. Alice and Bob have been acting in many cryptographic papers, so they know that the key should be changed often. So, they change the key every day, but to save computations only in one byte, so that all the bytes in the key are changed after eight days. Nowhere in the literature have they found evidence that this should be dangerous. Using SAFER it will be. Eve hasn't appeared in as many papers as Alice and Bob, but is smart enough to trick one of the parties into encrypting many chosen plaintexts every day. Eve nds 8 bits of the secret key with probability 3:5 256 every day, except the rst day, using at most 2 47 chosen plaintexts. We assume here that the time to sort and compare ciphertexts is negligible compared to the time of getting the many encryptions. After 73 days Eve has used about 2 53 chosen plaintexts and with a probability 0.63 found at least 8 key bits. The number of chosen plaintexts can be reduced to 2 50 , if Eve can predict which byte of the secret key is changed from day to day. Similar attacks on SAFER with a reduced number of rounds will have much lower complexities.
The Rotations and Bias Additions
In this section we consider the rotations and bias additions used in the key schedule of SAFER. In 6] it is argued that the bias additions prevent weak keys. Moreover, by letting out the key biases, for any key K there exists another key K , such that the rst 5 rounds of the encryption function induced by K are the same as the last 5 rounds of the encryption function induced by K . This is not a desirable property as illustrated in 3, 4, 1]. We have found a reason to have byte rotations as well.
Lemma 5. PHT has 256 xed points.
This result can be found by using Gauss-eliminations on the 8 8 matrix of PHT etc. In each xed point every byte value is a multiple of 64. There are 16 xed points where every byte value is either 0 or 128. They are given in Table 4 . If ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ) ( 0 0 0 0 128 128 0 0 ) ( 0 0 128 0 0 0 128 0 ) ( 0 0 128 0 128 128 128 0 ) ( 0 128 0 128 0 0 0 0 ) ( 0 128 one leaves out the key rotations, but keeps the addition of the biases then these 16 xed points for PHT are "linear structures" for SAFER with any number of rounds in the following way. Let a 1 ; ::::::;a 16 be the xed points from Table 4 . Let E(K; P) = C be the encrypted value of plaintext P using key K, then E(K; P) = C ) E(K + a i ; P + a i ) = C:
where '+' is bytewise addition modulo 256. Thus, an exhaustive search for the key could be reduced by a factor of 16 using 16 chosen plaintexts. The 16 xed points are the only linear structures. Fixed points with entries of values 64 or 192 are a ected/destroyed by the group operation changes exclusive-or/addition mod 256, but the values 0 and 128 are not, which follows from Lemma 2. The above illustrates that SAFER needs both key rotations and bias additions in the key schedule.
Collision of Hash Functions
Often a block cipher is used as building block in hash functions. A hash function for which the hash code is of the same size as the block cipher is called a single block length hash function. In these hash functions the message blocks are hashed in a number of rounds, each round requiring one encryption of the underlying block cipher. There are essentially 12 secure single block length hash functions, which by a linear transformation of the inputs to one round of the hash function can be transformed into only 2 di erent schemes 8, 9]:
The rst scheme is known as the Davies-Meyer scheme. These schemes are believed to be secure, in the sense that, if the underlying block cipher has no weaknesses, free-start preimage attacks and free-start collision attacks have time complexities 2 m and 2 m=2 encryptions, respectively, of the underlying m-bit block cipher 5, 8] . In a free-start attack the attacker is free to choose the initial values. Using SAFER as the underlying block cipher it is possible to nd both free-start and xed-start collisions with a complexity of much less than the brute force method of 2 32 operations. Also, we note that the attacks to follow will be applicable to many double block length hash functions based on a block cipher, since in free-start attacks it is possible to attack the two blocks independently. In the next section we show how to nd free-start collision for the schemes (4) and (5).
Free-start Collisions
In this section we exploit the phenomenon of Theorem 4. In the attacks to follow we choose two plaintexts di erent only in the byte for which both the keys and ciphertexts di er. We hope in this way to obtain plain-and ciphertexts and keys, such that E K1 (P 1 ) P 1 = E K2 (P 2 ) P 2 or E K1 (P 1 ) P 1 K 1 = E K2 (P 2 ) P 2 K 2
We can speed up this search by choosing the inputs of SAFER to the third round, such that the keys encrypt equally in the second and third rounds. When we nd two ciphertexts di erent in only one byte, we calculate the plaintexts and check for a collision. In the optimal cases these collisions can be found in estimated time about 2 22:8 encryptions of SAFER. In Table 5 we give examples of such collisions for hash functions of type (4). The rst collision was found in time 2 20:6 encryptions, the second collision in time 2 19:3 encryptions.
Initial value (pl. text) Message (key)
Hash code 6e 32 68 46 c8 fd f1 a9 6f 2d 73 46 e1 2f 62 45 e5 12 8b 4d 3d 58 c2 18 6e 32 68 46 c8 fd f1 9c 6f 2d 73 46 e1 2f 62 f7 e5 12 8b 4d 3d 58 c2 18 f4 b1 a3 27 0b ed 78 a9 57 f5 9b 4e 49 77 0a 45 54 43 57 c4 be f9 88 c9 f4 b1 a3 27 0b ed 78 9c 57 f5 9b 4e 49 77 0a f7 54 43 57 c4 be f9 88 c9 Table 5 . Free-start collisions for hash functions of type (4) It is possible to nd free-start collisions for hash functions of type (5) 4e 79 3f c3 4f 52 5b 6d e6 02 f2 54 f0 59 a8 a7 a9 3e 8c 23 30 c3 b4  4e 79 3f c3 4f 52 5b e5 e6 02 f2 54 f0 59 a8 a7 a9 3e 8c 23 30 c3 b4  9d e5 f5 c1 bc eb 71 6d 9b 13 2f 4d f5 7a b5 11 47 f9 f4 53 c8 e3 17  9d e5 f5 c1 bc eb 71 e5 9b 13 2f 4d f5 7a b5 11 47 f9 f4 53 c8 e3 17   Table 6 . Fixed-start collisions for hash functions of type (5) with SAFER.
Fixed-start Collisions
Although the collisions found in the last section are considered hard to nd, if the underlying block cipher has no weaknesses, it is interesting to nd collisions also for a xed start. Using our observations about SAFER this cannot be done for the hash round function (4), since if the plaintexts are equal for two related keys the hash value of (4) will always be di erent. However, it is possible to nd collisions if we consider two rounds of the hash function. Assume H 0 is a xed initial value. Using the related key properties described earlier in this paper one nds M 1 (5) it is possible to nd xed start collisions for the hash round function. For our pseudo-collisions for SAFER, see Table 1 , the ciphertexts and keys di er in the same byte. Therefore when both the plaintexts and the keys are fed forward in the hash mode, we can obtain collisions. The di erence in the ciphertexts of Table 1 is equal to the di erence in the last-round keys, which is not necessarily the di erence in the keys themselves. Therefore for this attack to work we must use pairs of keys for which the byte di erences in the keys are equal to the byte di erences in the last-round keys of the keys. An exhaustive search reveals many pairs of keys with this property. Two keys di erent only in the fth byte with values 9 and 129 respectively, encrypt about 2 28 plaintexts in the same way. By using similar techniques as for free-start collisions one can show that a collision can be found in expected time about 2 22 encryptions. In Table 6 we list such collisions. The rst collision was found in time 2 22:3 encryptions, the second collision in time 2 20:0 encryptions. Many of our collision implementations ran faster than expected, which may be due to the fact that probabilities in (3) are not independent as assumed.
Improvements of SAFER
In this section we suggest modi cations of SAFER, such that the above attacks cannot be e ected. An obvious and immediate way is to increase the number of rounds.
An Increased Number of Rounds
In SAFER with 8 rounds there are still many pairs of keys encrypting some plaintexts the same way. In the optimal case a pair of keys encrypt 1:5 2 14 plaintexts into the same ciphertexts after 8 rounds of encryption using our method. The output transformation makes those ciphertexts di er in one byte. But in contrast to SAFER with 6 rounds collisions cannot be found faster than the time of 2 32 encryptions. Still, it must be an undesirable property for a block cipher. In the optimal case for SAFER with 10 rounds a pair of keys encrypt equally for all 10 rounds with probability of only 2 ?66 using our method. Since there are only 2 64 di erent plaintexts there are no keys with the above phenomenon.
New Key Schedule for SAFER
Another and in our taste better solution is to change the key schedule. The discoveries in this paper come from the fact that a key is applied to the text input before and just after the S-box, thus enabling collisions considering one byte isolated in every round. One way to hinder this is, paradoxically, to remove the second xor/addition of the key in every round or just in one of the middle rounds. To nd collisions similar to the ones we've found would now require an incorporation of the PHT-transformation. That seems very unlikely to succeed. But, the fact that a one byte key is connected to the same S-box in every round seems dangerous and unnecessary. We give a modi ed key schedule for SAFER with any number of rounds. Let K = (k 1;1 ; :::; k 1;8 ) be an 8 byte key and let
The round keys are de ned as follows. K 1;j = k 1;j for j = 1; :::; 8 and k i;j = k i?1;j << 3 K i;j = k i;(i+j?2mod9)+1 + bias i; j] mod 256 for i = 2; :::; 2r+ 1, j = 1; :::; 8. There is a circular shift of the nine key bytes. In that way the 8 key bytes k 1 ; :::; k 8 are connected to di erent S-boxes from round to round. The parity byte is introduced to provide an avalanche e ect in the key schedule. The new key schedule ensures that the round keys of two di erent keys are always di erent in two bytes in some rounds and in one byte in the remaining rounds. For instance, in SAFER with 6 rounds, two keys will be di erent in two bytes in 9 out of the 13 round keys. In SAFER with 8 rounds, this will be the case in 13 out of the 17 round keys. Thus, our method of nding key-collisions is no longer applicable. Also, note that if the key is chosen uniformly at random, any round key is uniformly random.
Conclusion
We described a weakness in the key schedule of SAFER K-64 and exploited it to establish a related-key attack much faster than a brute force attack, and showed by examples that collisions for the standard hashing modes based on a block cipher using SAFER K-64 are easy to nd. A new key schedule was suggested, so that the resulting cipher is invulnerable to our attacks. To conclude, we believe that the results presented in this paper show that a change in the key schedule of SAFER K-64 is necessary.
